Category: Research Paper
Stereotyping 2 Essay, Research Paper
This unit is designed to make older middle school students look at and reflect upon art and film and to create art work with a deepening awareness of identity and an understanding of stereotype. Examining stereotype in contemporary life, in personal experience, as a tool used by artists to heighten understanding, and the uses and absence of stereotype in depiction of characters in cinema are key components of this series of lessons. In addition to looking at and being critical, students are asked to create art work which expresses and elaborates upon these ideas. Through analysis of image and stereotype, students will consider and evolve a more complex perception of personal identity.
At the core of the curriculum and educational mission of the Visual Art Department at Betsy Ross Arts Magnet School are certain ubiquitous goals which drive all aspects of the program. Among these goals is to imbue units and individual lessons with subject-matter which causes reflection on personal identity and diversity, individual differences and similarities. The Visual Art curriculum seeks to investigate world cultures throughout the four year program. The cultures of the students in attendance at the school are emphasized as well as Native American cultures. Comparisons and connections are made. Students identify and examine their personal heritage and culture. Students look at their differences and similarities. Art work is generated from this inquiry. In seeking to apply and use cultural diversity and identity in art, the problems and challenges of stereotypes emerge. The less familiar we are with individuating characteristics of others, the more likely we are to treat them in terms of their ascribed group membership, or as stereotypes. (Goldberg 29) This unit seeks to enable students to identify, confront, analyze and critique racial stereotype, to know each other as unique individuals, and to further develop their sense of identity.
Uses of Stereotype in Art and Film
Contemporary artists address stereotype and identity in a variety of ways. Some of these approaches and the resulting art works will be employed to teach several of the lessons in this unit.
The role of the artist in confronting stereotype and racism and effectively using it in art in order to move forward in a process of mending and recovery is articulated by art critic, Lucy Lippard.
So what does it take to turn a stereotype around, to undermine a commonly assumed realism? The options for breaking patterns, reversing stigmas, and conceiving a new and more just world picture are many and multifaceted. They range from opening wounds, to seeking revenge through representation, to reversing destructive developments so the healing process can begin. To turn a stereotype around, it is necessary to be extreme, to depart from, rather than merely engage with, accepted norms and romanticized aspirations. Stereotypes have the borrowed power of the real, even when they are turned around in the form of positive images by those trying to regain their pasts. It is necessary to depart from stereotype in two senses-to take off from it and finally to leave it behind. The effective turnaround is a doubling back rather than a collusion or a dispersion. It can be an unexpectedly vicious dig in the ribs indicating that the joke s on you, or a double vision that allows different cultures to understand each other even as they speak in different ways. Transformation of self and society is finally the aim of all this mobile work that spins the status quo around. While irony, with its tinge of bitterness as well as humor, is the prevalent instrument, another is healing, in which the artist, as neo-shaman, heals her or himself, as a microcosm of society.(Lippard 241)
Gary Simmons is one example of a contemporary visual artist who takes Lippard s approach. He strives to confront and wipe out stereotype through the use of metaphor. He redraws old racist cartoons, exaggerated characters with powerful stereotypical attributes which are not unlike stereotypical characters from early films. The cartoons are drawn in smudged chalk, a transient material, on blackboards, an icon of primary/secondary education. He attempts to teach his audience as the teacher attempts to teacher the student.
Gary Simmons s career has been based on a canny combination of polemic subject matter and Post-Minimal technique. Drawing with chalk on large slate blackboards, he has revived the racist figures of old cartoons only to deconstruct them by smudging their outlines with erasers. The French philosopher Jacques Derrida, who writes of using outmoded concepts under eraser, would probably see Mr. Simmons s images as perfect metaphors for the persistence of prejudicial stereotypes in a supposedly color-blind society. (Karmel C27)
The uses of stereotype in artistic production are complex and subtle. Nuances, convolutions, and contradictions energize the art. Although these intricacies should be appreciated and are the qualities that make art truly interesting, the simplified systems of stereotype are often useful in that they facilitate understanding, especially by the lay adult audience and youths. Without understanding, the message is completely lost. Likewise, with a greater level of understanding, the message becomes magnified. Although both types of artists, visual artists and filmmakers, work in visual media their paths to the same goal can differ significantly. Generally speaking, to combat racism and stereotype, visual artists employ the stereotype image as a weapon turning it upon itself, filmmakers seek to depart from the stereotype image and replace it with a real image and authentic portrayal of African American life. The exception in cinema is situations in which stereotypical characters are used to critique themselves. This technique is similar to that used by visual artists, but more difficult to decode in film for the students for whom this unit was written. Therefore, this unit focuses on stereotype and identity in cinema in which real character portrayal is the goal.
Film Historian Ed Guerrero calls on African American filmmakers to meet the challenge of changing the image perpetuated by the film industry. He urges black filmmakers to take control of their representation and create true characters and situations by complex, innovative and artistic means.
Perhaps here it is best to conclude with the riddle so brilliantly posed in the opening of Bill Duke s powerful crime-action drama about passing, dissembling, and double consciousness, Deep Cover (1992). Applying for an undercover assignment, a black cop (Larry Fishburne) is interviewed by a slimy Washington bureaucrat who, in order to test Fishburne s cool, asks him a Zen-like question, What s the difference between a black man and a nigger? The question is supposed to have no answer, or innumerable answers, as African Americans must confront or negotiate this question every day of their lives. Fishburne, his face a cool, dissembling mask, responds by saying in effect that a nigger is someone who would even try to answer such a question. In a referential parallel manner, then, this question highlights something at the heart of the African American cinematic challenge. All black filmmakers confront exactly this defining task. Fishburne, playing the masked trickster, answers appropriately to his situation in the movie, but black filmmakers are obliged to respond in their films in complex political and aesthetic ways. If they fail to do so, they surrender control over the production of the ideas, images, and narratives that so indelibly define the limits and possibilities of black life in America. Only by weighing the many possible answers that arise in the riddle-like social transactions of race can black filmmakers create authentic humanized images and narratives of black life. (Guerrero 207-8)
Like Lippard s conclusion that art and artists who address stereotype can ultimately help in a healing process and positive outcome for all people, Donald Bogle, film critic, similarly argues that film and black filmmakers have the same power.
If there are to be significant black films, the black actors, the directors, the writers, the producers, and the technicians who are now being given a chance to work must articulate the contemporary black s mind, his/her point of view, aspirations, and goals. The black filmmaker must come to terms with the world he or she lives, whether it be 125th Street and Lenox Avenue or an integrated suburb that is perhaps nothing more than a prison. Black films can liberate audiences from illusions, black and white, and in so freeing can give all of us vision and truth. (Bogle 302-3)
Perhaps this series of lessons can direct students toward becoming free from the false illusions and misrepresentations alluded to by Bogle, and move them closer to a more genuine understanding of themselves and others.
This curriculum unit is composed of seven lessons that are designed for use in middle school, grades 7 and 8. It stresses a critical examination of visual art and film, in particular, the uses of identity and stereotype in the representation of people and characters. The lessons employ both media with an emphasis on visual art, as well as a wide variety of age appropriate readings, informational videotapes, writing, and discussion. Students work individually and in cooperative groups to encourage dialogue and literacy. Oral and written articulation of concepts, ideas, and thoughts are balanced with a studio component. Visual articulation stresses a hands-on approach and demonstrates and reinforces student understanding and shows a synthesis of knowledge of complex topics. All of the examples of stereotype in art were made by African American artists. There are two reasons for this perspective. First, art work addressing stereotype and the accompanying resources for a youth audience is most readily available on African American artists. Second, the African American student population at Betsy Ross Arts Magnet, for which this unit was designed is greater than any other group. Examples by Asian artists, Native American artist and Latino artists could be sought, although they are not currently as abundant or easily accessible. The lessons could also apply and materials sought to teach about gender stereotypes as well.
Lions Led By Donkeys. Essay, Research Paper
“Lions led by donkeys.” Can this criticism be applied fairly to the Allied
leaders responsible for the Gallipoli Campaign? Discuss.
The Gallipoli Campaign is recorded in British history and through popular memory
as a heroic disaster: a possibly war-winning scheme that ended in complete
disarray. The horror of the First World War was encapsulated in this microcosm
of the wider conflict. It shared much with the Western Front in terms of the
discomfort of the trenches and the stalemate that came with them. But it also
had the difficulties of the amphibious nature of the operation as well as the
extremes of climate that the troops experienced. The Leadership that sent the
Allied troops to the Dardenelles has often been criticised for the foolhardiness
of the operation, but as the British Official Historian stated: “There is little
doubt today that the idea of forcing the straits …… was one of the few great
strategical concepts of the world war.” So why now does the whole campaign
receive criticism as strong as the following?
With the possible exception of the Crimean War, the Gallipoli expedition was the
most poorly mounted and ineptly controlled operation in modern British military
The answer lies within the quotation itself, specifically that it was “poorly
mounted and ineptly controlled”. In order to demonstrate this it will be
necessary to consider several levels of the “leadership” involved with the
operation. Initially the political-strategical decision making must be studied
as the root to the operations problems. The Naval and Army’s planning must also
be scrutinised as this fundamentally doomed the troops to failure. Finally the
tactical leadership must be considered in light of the situation developing on
the ground and how the Turks reacted to the amphibious landings.
Before scrutinising the expedition in any detail the background of the situation
must be explained so that one can have some sort of perspective on the decisions
that were made. By the end of 1914 a stalemate had developed in Europe. Already,
after only three full months of fighting, there were almost one million Allied
casualties and a trench system that stretched three hundred and fifty miles from
the North Sea to the Swiss Alps. No obvious successes were apparent in this
impasse; the Allies did not even seem to be wearing down the Germans in this
attritional form of warfare. Thus within the British higher command people were
looking at some form of flanking manoeuvre. Churchill and Lloyd George were keen
proponents of considering alternatives other than focusing entirely on the
theatre of conflict in the West. However many of the British and French General
Staff were wholly resolute on attacking the Germans head-on, quite
understandably so for the over-run French. As for the British, with their
traditional strength lying in their Naval and expeditionary forces, one is
surprised that alternatives to a continental land war were not considered more
readily. For example Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord’s proposition of a Naval
led invasion into Northern Germany through the Baltic. No such plans were given
much credibility by the General Staff’s overwhelming desire to fight a land war.
Ultimately this opposition of the General Staff was soon tempered by events in
The battles of Masurian Lakes and Tannenberg, August 1914 crippled Russia’s
war-fighting ability in two successive blows by the Germans. In order for the
Allies to keep Germany under pressure the war had to be fought on two fronts.
Those in the West were determined to prolong Russia’s war efforts for as long as
possible. Therefore when the British received requests for assistance from The
Grand Duke Nicholas, The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies, they were
taken seriously. In effect what he suggested was a naval or military
demonstration in order to place pressure on the Turks who were in turn placing
pressure on the Russian Army in the Caucasus. The pivotal role that the
Gallipoli operation could have had can clearly be seen from this summary by Sir
The advantages to be derived from forcing the straits were perfectly obvious.
Such a success would, as the advocates of the project said, serve to secure
Egypt, to induce Italy and the Balkan states to come in on our side, and, if
followed by the forcing of the Bosporus, would enable Russia to draw munitions
from America and Western Europe, and to export her accumulated supplies of
Although a most succinct appraisal of the situation ironically Robertson opposed
the scheme. This was a characteristic of the Dardenelles operation in that many
people in positions of authority could see the benefits that it could
potentially bring yet still they would not take their focus from Western Europe.
Thus a key facet to the campaign’s failure was in British high command;
throughout its implementation there was a constant need to plan based on
compromise. On a strategic level the disparity between the military commanders
and the political leadership of the country was immediately apparent. The
political hierarchy had a broader perspective of the international situation;
they realised the potential that Turkey held in the Dardenelles’ position and
therefore coveted it. The Military command, predominantly the Army were solely
focused on the job in hand. The Turks, however, were also aware of the British
need to have influence in the area. They were also aware that Russia and Greece
were only too willing to join Britain in supporting any such operation as it
would allow Turkish lands to be carved up as spoils of war. A result of which
would be the Russian gain of much desired access to “warm-water” ports. Due to
these pressures the Turks were pushed toward German influence at a very early
stage of the war because of the perceived greater threat from the Allies.
The military hierarchy had, as previously suggested, been totally focused on the
forces deployed in France. Kitchener was initially resolute that he had no
forces which he could possibly send eastward. A result of this was an attempt to
force the straits with a purely naval operation of a combined British and French
fleet during February and March 1915, as a result of the Russian call for
assistance. This was not the first attempt of the war to use a naval force to
attack the area of the Straits. In November 1914 the Mediterranean Squadron of
the Royal Navy bombarded the forts at Sedd-el-bahr and Kum Kale either side of
the mouth of the Dardenelles. This twenty minute action did little to the Turks
other than wake them to the prospect of further, perhaps more serious attempts
to force the straits. The initial plan of 1915 to try and take the Straits by a
progressive bombardment whilst steadily moving up the channel. The over-riding
reason was the political aim of the operation, in that its intention was to
relieve pressure on Russian military forces. What also spurred the naval project
forward was the success, albeit limited, of the previous year’s bombardment. The
Royal Navy did recognise the land based threat that the forts held however what
they failed to realise that in order to prevent the guns being repaired and
brought back into action the ground had to be held. The small parties of Marines
that did actually go ashore during the operation, although not necessarily for
this purpose, were inadequate. It was more through the dogmatic insistence of
Churchill and Admiral Fisher in the Admiralty on the operation that had it
approved, rather than any sound military planning. In fact the Admiralty and
General Staff had studied proposals for attacking Turkey through the Dardenelles
in 1904, 1906, 1908 and 1911 and had concluded a naval force alone could not
achieve the aim. Yet still the British hierarchy allowed the operation to
continue because of its strategic importance. Any chance of real success for the
later joint operations were severely limited by this “compromised” attempt at
By 23 March 1915, after a month of attempting the naval option both Admiral de
Robeck and General Sir Ian Hamilton considered the plan to have failed. Under
the command of Admiral Carden, de Robeck’s predecessor and originator of the
plan, the fleet had lost a third of its strength: six ships in all to mines and
gun-battery fire. Hamilton had been dispatched by Kitchener to aid Carden with
forces drawn from the Middle East. Fundamentally this decision had been arrived
at too late and this phase of the operations mounted in the area were at an end.
Again this period of action in the Dardenelles had forewarned the Turks and
their German advisory command under General Liman von Sanders. So the actual
landings themselves were a part of larger picture of operations which had
occurred in the area of the Dardenelles. Each British engagement had escalated
the level of violence and each attempt to force the Dardenelles was only just
rebuffed until a full scale landing force was required to achieve any
Sir Ian Hamilton was given an “Army” to conduct the Gallipoli campaign, but this
was very much an army in terms of paperwork rather than experience. It consisted
of a mix and match of various units from throughout the Empire. By far the most
experienced was the 29th Division which consisted of various Regular units drawn
from overseas postings. As a Division they had hardly operated at all, and the
operation they were about to embark on was far from the usual garrisoning
activities that they were used to conducting. After the 29th the only other unit
with any real prior experience was the Royal Navy Division. This too had its
flaws, in that it comprised of mainly fleet Marines who had predominantly served
as auxiliaries to ships. This was apparent in their lack of heavy equipment;
they were seriously lacking in any sort of artillery. Even at this stage one can
see how the higher command back in England, with its preoccupation with the
Western Front, severely hampered the efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean by the
nature of the “experienced” troops it provided. The remainder and the bulk of
the force was made up of conscripted men. The Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps (ANZACS) were to prove their valour in the following action, but also to
show their inadequate training and experience on the tactical level of command.
Supplementing these forces was an Indian Brigade and a Territorial Division both
of which lacked any indirect fire support. In all the lack of Artillery was to
prove one of the decisive points in the forthcoming fighting. The Turkish guns
and snipers were to prove themselves deadly adversaries to the exposed troops,
especially in the ANZAC areas. The lack of Allied fire support compounded the
difficulty the men had in attacking high ground over exposed slopes. The
inadequate fire support can also trace its origins to the strategic level
planning. The Western front itself had scarcely adequate shells or artillery
pieces and each gun averaged less than ten rounds per day, a hopeless amount
during offensive operations. In terms of the Gallipoli offensive on paper the
Divisions involved were supposed to have had a compliment of at least three
hundred and six guns to support them; in reality they had one hundred and
eighteen. Here again the influence of the Western front was to take its toll:
the landings on the 25th April coincided with the 2nd Ypres offensive, the
stock-piling of munitions for this had a knock on effect on the Gallipoli
Thus the nature of the troops that were to conduct this operation and the
manner in which they were prepared was to play a decisive role in the conduct of
the operation. Flaws in the strategic planning were to have a noticeable effect
during the later campaign. Flaws that could have been avoided had the operation
been planned from the start as a decisive joint operation. Instead the
intermittent efforts of the Royal Navy, who were clearly forced into action
prematurely by political pressure in the need to support Russia and Churchill’s
insistence on action, warned the Turks of future attacks.
Although fettered by the insufficient material support from his superiors,
Hamilton’s concept of operations and planning was actually quite successful in
that Liman von Sanders could not pin-point where the main thrust of the landings
was to arrive. Even on the first day of the landings von Sanders concentrated
his own efforts around Bulair forty miles to the North of Cape Helles. However,
events were to take a turn for the worse through accident and more significantly
lack of command. A comparison of the events on the 25th of April show very
different reactions by the ANZACS and British forces. In the case of the ANZACS
mistakes on landing sites were to cripple their operation, for the Lancashire
Regiment on W and V beaches of Cape Helles it was to save many lives. The
reaction of the two different units shows the contrast between the experienced
and inexperienced but also highlights the flaws of the command and control in
each. The ANZAC forces were to land North of the main beaches in the area of
Gaba Tepe, however, either through navigational error or the effect of currents
they landed several miles further up the coast. The effect of this was
ultimately to stifle the Antipodeans’ assault.
Although they did make rapid inroads initially with little resistance they
floundered under the counter-attack led by Mustafa Kemal the commander of the
Turkish 19th Division. In reality Kemal had only a Regiment to hold the ANZACS
within their perimeter. But the Australian and New Zealanders showed their lack
of combat experience during these early vital stages. Instances of the ANZACS
being delayed on seeing the Turks lie down made them hesitate enough for
reinforcements to arrive under Kemal’s control. The ANZACS had assumed that
there was some sort of threat hence the Turks taking cover, in fact it was a
deception plan devised by Kemal. A ruse that would not have worked on the more
battle hardened troops who would have been aware of the urgency to push on
during this early phase. The ANZAC commanders were not resolute in their
actions; the incorrect landing sites threw them off guard which led them to make
fundamental errors that were to cause constant problems later. The ANZACS were
aware that they had to push inland yet instead of adapting to the location in
which they found themselves they tried to stick to the original plan. They
attempted to march onto their original objectives, but the geography and enemy
resistance were to hamper them. This inertia caused the ANZACS to fail to see
that in the environment they found themselves domination of the high ground was
paramount for success. By the time they realised this Mustafa Kemal had
consolidated his positions even though throughout this phase of the battle he
had be outnumbered by no less than three to one.
The 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers were to assault the two central beaches
of the main landing sites. These were named W and V and were to be the location
of some of the bloodiest fighting of the first day. For the Lancashires relief
for the troops caught in the thick of the fray came from a company who had
landed incorrectly to the flank on the main position. The significant difference
between these regular soldiers and the ANZACS was they used the mistake to their
advantage and rolled up the flank of the enemy, thus relieving the troops on the
beach. The resolute spirit of the Lancashires is reflected in their Regimental
toast which originates from that day: “Six VC’s before breakfast!” The result of
the blood shed on these beaches and those immediately neighbouring them was that
the original landing parties were a spent force. They could not consolidate
their gains. It is at this point that the planning and command structure’s
failings show the most.
The concept of the landings was successful in that Liman von Sanders did not
know were to concentrate his forces in order to repel the British. A
diversionary landing by the French at Kum Kale across the Bosporus was a success
and drew much of the Turkish forces to the Asiatic side of the Dardenelles.
Equally the demonstration by the Royal Naval Division drew attention away from
the landings around Cape Helles. However, it was through the resilience of the
sub-units of the Turkish Army that the landings failed to achieve their desired
effects. The majority of the resistance that the British encountered came from
platoon or company held positions which were well sited to counter an attack.
The failing that the British experienced was not indecisiveness, as was the case
with the ANZACS, but their inflexibility. These Regular units were well
practised in the traditional British ordered form of fighting. However, this
resulted in an inability to move away from the given plan in order to adapt to
the situation on the ground. This was certainly the case at Cape Helles. Whilst
three regiments were being massacred on the central axis of the landings the
units on the flanks had taken their objectives. Tragically they were either
unaware or reluctant to do anything about the situation less than two miles
march from their own positions.
Hamilton was also at fault during this time. He had ensconced himself on HMS
Queen Elizabeth during the battle. The ship itself had its own responsibilities
during the landings in terms of providing fire support, and had inadequate
signalling equipment for an amphibious force commander. So from the outset
Hamilton had cut himself off from any direct intervention with the action on the
ground. At most he could steam up and down the coast, but this too was also
constrained by the missions of the warship. Furthermore the two corps
commanders, Hunter-Weston with the British at Cape Helles and Birdwood with the
ANZACS at Gaba Tepe, were also afloat and they too had inadequate signalling
equipment to the shore. Fundamentally those that were in command of the major
areas of responsibility were not in any position to react to the situation on
the ground. It was from this that the momentum of the Allied landings ground to
a halt. Lack of experience and inertia at the lower levels of command and the
Commander-in-Chief’s inability to formulate any sort of informed picture of
events on the ground caused the operation to flounder at this early, vital
Subsequent operations in the Dardenelles were equally unsuccessful. By the end
of May U-boats had sunk three British ships providing fire support. As a result
HMS Queen Elizabeth was withdrawn with the rest of the Fleet supporting the
operations causing the support for those on land to be weakened further still.
The Sulva Bay landings during August 1915 were much more adequately equipped for
instance they had powered barges capable of landing up to five hundred men. Yet
the fundamental problems were still there: inertia from inexperience on the
ground, and the distanced and non-contactble senior commanders. The latter were
often so inured by their Western Front experiences during the Sulva Bay landings
that they too readily dug in. This later phase of the Dardenelles campaign
showed that the soldiers were far from defeated themselves. The diversionary
attack by the ANZACS during the Sulva Bay landings were extremely costly in
terms of casualties, however, the soldiers demonstrated their fighting spirit in
that fifteen Victoria Crosses were awarded at the Battle of Lone Pine Ridge
Hamilton’s replacement, Sir Charles Monro, was mocked by Churchill because his
first recommendation on arrival in October 1915 was to withdraw. Churchill
stated “He came, he saw, he capitulated.” However, Monro was a Western Front
commander held in high regard. On inspecting the situation himself Kitchener
agreed to Monro’s plans. Even at this late stage of the Gallipoli campaign one
can see the machinations of politics at work in the decision-making process.
Huge pressure had been levied upon the British hierarchy to conduct this
operation, yet its execution was half-hearted in terms of preparation at the
strategic level and ineptly commanded at the tactical level. Again the British
Official Historian puts this quite succinctly:
Many reasons combined to frustrate an enterprise the success of which in 1915
would have altered the course of the war. But every reason will be found to
spring from one fundamental cause – an utter lack of preparation before the
This lack of preparation can be seen in the intermittent naval actions that did
little material damage to the Turks but succeeded in warning them of further
action. These were carried out with complete disregard to prior tactical
planning that had taken place concerning the very same scenario. Nonetheless the
pressure that was placed upon those in Government, particularly Churchill, for
the operation to succeed caused sound tactical planning such as the need for
surprise to be ignored. Hamilton’s attempts were crippled from the outset due to
the inadequate experience of the bulk of his forces, and the lack of necessary
battle-winning artillery. His method of command was the underlying factor
however in that it was indecisive and far too removed to affect the action on
the ground. At lower levels this caused stagnation and stalemate on the
18 December 2012Joint research paper, published by the scientists of the Kazan Federal University and the National Autonomous University of Mexico, was acknowledged by Revista FACMED magazine.
The studied species of mollusks: Lymnaea cubensis (Mexico, left) and Lymnaea truncatula (Russia, right)
Joint research paper, written by the scientists of the Kazan Federal University and the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), was published in December in Revista FACMED journal, issued by Medical School, UNAM. “Study of Lymnaea truncatula and Lymnaea cubensis mollusk tissues infected by Fasciola hepatica miracidia” article was selected � 1 by the editors in the category of “Original Research” in the annual contest between the research papers published in the journal during the year. Being published in the New Year’s issue and being a winner in this nomination marks a significant achievement of both Russian and Mexcican scientists. It’s should be noted that the Revista FACMED journal is reviewed by SCOPUS database with the impact factor equal to 2,5.
The present work investigated the penetration pathways of Fasciola hepática into the hepatopancreas of Lymnaea truncatula and Lymnaea cubensis. two mollusks obtained from Fasciolosis endemic areas in Russia and Mexico, respectively. The larval trajectory showed dissolution of intercellular substance and deformation of epithelial cells of mollusk’s tissues. Cytological changes in the ductal epithelium of the digestive gland and in the connective tissue of hepatopancreas were found. Some differences in the penetration and damage pathways in the two species of mollusks studied were observed; thus highlighting the differences in the environmental conditions prevailing in each geographic area.
The group of scientists who conducted the study included Prof. F.M. Sokolina (Department of Invertebrate zoology and functional histology), G.A. Ignatyev (Department of Bioecology, Postgraduate ), and E.A. Cabrera Fuentes (Kazan Federal and Giessen Universities postgraduate). Research group was led by Prof. MD. Jose Trinidad Sanchez Vega (UNAM), the author of the “Fundamentals of Medical Microbiology and Parasitology” book, published in Mexico, in 2011. The book was written in co-authorship with Hector Cabrera Fuentes.
Congratulations to our scientists with a high assessment of their research work and we wish them every success!
Those interested are welcome to read the online version of the journal following the link (in Spanish).
Source of information: External Relations Office
Title of Lesson. A Colorful World
Appropriate Age. Six years old.
Objectives. At six years old, most children already have set preconceptions of how things are supposed to look. This lesson is designed for them to use their imaginations and experiment with color. They will get to look at landscapes painted by Paul Gauguin to see how he experimented with and used color. The students also practice using oil pastels and their techniques. They will also get a chance to work from life (either outdoors or pictures).
Materials. Photographs of the outdoors (taken in advance by the teacher), prints of some of Paul Gauguin’s landscapes, white paper, and oil pastels will be needed for this lesson.
Motivation. The class is told that they will be creating a picture of the outside world (landscape). The teacher asks the class – What color is the sky. the grass. a field. a lake. a tree. The students are then told that for this lesson they are to forget about all that.
The teacher introduces the Post-Impressionist painter Paul Gauguin to the class. A variety of his paintings are shown to the class including – Matamoe ( a landscape with peacocks), Tahitian Pastorals (has a red body of water), Tahitian Landscape watercolor (trees and bushes all different colors), and Riders on the Beach (the sand is painted pink). The different colors used are pointed out to the class while looking at the paintings.
The teacher asks the class to imagine a world where every thing is a different color then what it normally is. The teacher tells them to keep that image in their head. The teacher does a demonstration using oil pastels reminding the students of the different techniques that can be used.
Procedure. The class is going to be drawing a landscape. If it is not possible to go outside, photographs can be taken of trees, hills, streams, fields, ect. These photographs are to be passed out to each student for them to work from. The students are instructed to look at their picture and imagine that every thing is a different color, for example, a tree might be purple and the sky
might be green. The students are to use white paper and oil pastels to draw their landscapes. They are to use the different techniques of oil pastels – layering the colors, blending, pressing hard for a textured look or pressing soft. The students are to fill the whole paper and when they are finished, the pictures are to be hung up in the front of the class.
Closure. The students have their finished landscapes hung up for every one to view. Even though every thing in the pictures are different colors then normal, it is still very apparent what things are. It seems that changing the colors gives the pictures more feeling. The teacher asks the class what feelings they get from looking at the pictures. It is observed that the pictures look like “fairy tale worlds”. Most students used bright colors which gave the pictures a happy feeling. Some students used black and other dark colors which gave the pictures a scary feeling, making them look almost like a “forbidden land”.
Evaluation. The students got a chance to use their imaginations and experiment with color. They were able to use the colors differently then they normally do. They successfully used the oil pastels and their techniques. It seemed that the photographs worked just as well, if not better, then actually going outside.
Art and Writing Lesson
Title of Lesson. And To Think That I Saw It…
Appropriate Age. Six years old.
Objectives. This lesson is to get the students to activate passive knowledge and think more about the things that they see every day. The students will use their imaginations to make up a story about something that they see every day ( an animal, a plant, a car, ect.). The students will learn to convey their thoughts and ideas down on paper (with help from the teacher if needed). The students will also get to practice techniques of tempera paint.
Materials. To do this lesson, the materials needed are, the story And To Think That I Saw It On Mulberry Street by Dr. Seuss, writing paper, pencils, poster board, tempera paint, and paint brushes.
Motivation. The teacher starts the class off by reading And To Think That I Saw It On Mulberry Street by Dr. Seuss. This is a story about a boy who only sees a horse and wagon on his way home from school so he turns it into so much more (a whole parade) so that he has a story to tell his father. The students are to think of something that they see every day and make up a story about it. The teacher gives an example – Every day she looks out her window and sees a small cluster of trees. Only she doesn’t just see them as trees, she sees a whole family with a mom, dad, and children. When it starts getting cold out, the mom and dad shake their leaves off so that the children can use them to keep warm. The teacher tells the class that their stories can be about anything and as silly as they would like them to be.
Procedure. The students are to think of something that they see regularly and tell a story about it. Once they decide on their story, they are to write it down (with help from the teacher if needed). Each student will then get a piece of poster board to illustrate their story on. Using tempera paint, the students will paint a picture of the object that they selected. The picture should show the object’s personality or show it doing what ever it does in the story.
Closure. The students will take turns going in front of the class. They will tell their story and show their picture.
Note. This lesson will take two days.
Evaluation. Did the students use their imaginations to come up with a story? Did the students successfully put their thoughts down on paper? By reading their stories and looking at their pictures, is it clear what they were writing about? Did the students successfully use the tempera paints to create a picture of their story?
Title of Lesson. I Wish That I Had…
Appropriate Age. Six years old.
Objectives. This lesson is designed so that the students use their imaginations. They should also learn that they are best just the way they are. The students will practice and learn techniques of sculpy clay.
Materials. The materials needed for this lesson are the story I Wish That I Had Duck Feet by Theo. LeSieg, writing paper, pencils, and sculpy clay.
Motivation. The teacher reads the story I Wish That I Had Duck Feet by Theo. LeSieg to the class. Together as a class, talk about how even though the boy thought that it would be a lot of fun to have some thing different, like duck feet, there were always negatives that came out.
The teacher does a demonstration of how to make a person out of sculpy clay.
Procedure. Each student thinks of something that they would like to have like duck feet, wings, fins, or a turtle shell. With help from the teacher (if needed) the students are to write down a list of reasons why they would like it and another list of reasons why they are better without it.
Using sculpy clay, the students will make themselves with whatever it is that they want. They will first make their body by rolling the sculpy -making it long and round. They will then roll a ball out for their head. Place the head on top of the body, push it down hard enough so that it stays. Make the face by first pinching out a nose, the eyes will automatically be indented. To finish the face and add detail, the sculpy can be pinched out or added on to. Use pieces of the sculpy to make arms, legs, feet, clothes, ect. (make sure that they are attached so that they do not fall off). Remind the students to add whatever it is that they want. Details and texture can be added with a pointed object like a sharpened pencil. When finished, they need to be cooked so that they harden. It may be necessary to have the students cook them at home.
– Bake the sculpy on a cooking tray at 275 degrees for about five minutes. If the sculpy is still
Closure. When the students are finished, they each get a chance to tell the class what it is that they would like to have and why. The whole class is to pretend that they have it.
Evaluation. Did the students use their imaginations when thinking of an animal part that they would like to have? Did the students successfully use the sculpy clay to portray themselves with this part? Were their projects each unique? Did the students come up with reasons why they would like to have this part? Did the students realize that they are better off with out it, being just the way that they are? Did the students enjoy pretending to have the animal parts?
Dramatic Play and Writing Lesson
Title of Lesson. What Do I Want To Be.
Appropriate Age. Six years old.
Objectives. The students will use their imaginations to think of what they would like to be if they could be any thing (no limits). The students will practice writing and conveying their thoughts on to paper. The students will use dramatic play to express their thoughts to the other classmates
Materials. To do this lesson, the materials needed are, the story book and song of In My Own Little Corner / lyrics by Oscar Hammerstein II, music by Richard Rodgers; illustrated by Katherin Potter, writing paper, and pencils.
Motivation. Listen to the song and read the story In My Own Little Corner. Discuss what the song is about – a little girl that, while sitting in a corner, imagines that she is many things like a dancing mermaid.
Procedure. Each student is to think of something that they would really like to be. Encourage the students to pick whatever they want no matter how different or strange it might seem – it can be anything from a whale in the ocean to a king of the jungle. Each student will take a turn acting it out in front of the class. The other students have to guess what it is that’s being acted out. Afterwards, have the students sit down in their seats and write why they want to be what they picked. The teacher may have to go around the room and help with the writing.
Closure. The students draw a picture of themselves being what it is that they want. These pictures are to be hung up around the classroom for every one to view.
Evaluation. Did the students use their imaginations to come up with something that they would like to be? Did they successfully act it out, and were the other students able to guess it?
Were the students able to write down their reason(s) for picking it? Were the students able to draw themselves as what they wanted to be?